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INTRODUCTION
 The September 11th terrorist attacks on the United States brought about an increased 
interest in the study of Islam and Islamist groups all over the world. The Middle East, in turn, 
became the subject of discussion in many American homes as the U.S went to war first with 
Afghanistan in 2001 and then Iraq in 2003. Since then, the growth of Islamist groups in the 
Middle East  and Northern Africa has been the source of some concern in the West, especially in 
Egypt, where the U.S relies on its alliance with the secular authoritarian regime. The removal of 
President Hosni Mubarak, who has been supported by the U.S. since his rise to power in 1981, 
after waves of protests calling for democratic change, has raised many concerns about  the future 
of Egyptian politics. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is by far the largest and most successful 
Islamist group in the world, although it  has never managed to claim state power. Despite the 
illegal status of the Brotherhood’s political party, it strongly influences Egyptian society through 
its extensive social services and its organizational capacity. Recent events have called into 
question the role the Muslim Brotherhood will play in the creation of a new government in 
Egypt. 
 During the period of liberalization experienced at the beginning of both Sadat and 
Mubarak’s regimes, the Brotherhood underwent a gradual transformation of its ideology  in the 
direction of democracy and political participation. The influence of such ideologues as Hasan al-
Banna, Hasan Isma‘il al-Hudaybi, Umar al-Tilmisani, and Yusef al-Qaradawi provided the 
foundation for this transition and spurred the movement towards the blending of civil and 
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religious agendas. Despite rifts in the movement, most notably between the new and old guard, 
vigorous ideological support for inclusion in the political system has developed in the past few 
decades. The promotion of a civil state that adheres to a constitutional system of governance 
within the constraints of Islamic law is a source of hope for the future participation of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in the creation of a democratic state.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE ORIGINS OF THE MOVEMENT: 
AL-BANNA AND THE PRE-REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD
 The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood began as a social-religious movement under the 
guidance of Hasan al-Banna, a schoolteacher working in Ismailia. Al-Banna was born in 1906 in 
the Delta Province of Beheira, where he was raised by his father, a respected religious scholar. 
As a youth, he attended a primary teacher’s school, where he participated in societies designed to 
uphold religious standards of morality. He became attracted to Sufi mysticism and the Order of 
the Hasafiyya Brothers. Ibn Khaldun, the fourteenth century  Arab historian, accurately  depicted 
Sufism as “dedication to worship, total dedication to Allah most High, disregard for the finery 
and ornament of the world, abstinence from the pleasure, wealth, and prestige sought by most 
men, and retiring from others to worship alone.”1 Al-Banna was attracted to the mystical and 
emotive aspects of Islam emphasized in Sufism. His progression through the ranks of the 
Hasafiyya Brothers shaped his belief that “the moral reform of the individual [is] a precondition 
to the Islamization of society.”2 The Hasafiyya Society  for Charity, a group created by al-Banna 
that fought to preserve Islamic morality and impede the work of Christian missionaries, would be 
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 1 "Sufism," BBC Religions, September 2009, http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/
islam/subdivisions/sufism_1.shtml (December 8, 2011).
 2 "Hasan Al-Banna," Sunni Forum, June 2004, http://www.sunniforum.com/forum/
showthread.php?10710-Hasan-al-Banna (November 11, 2011).
the forerunner of the Muslim Brotherhood.3 At the age of seventeen, he moved to Cairo to attend 
Dar al-‘Ulum, an institution of higher learning for teachers. In Cairo, he was confronted with a 
sense of the disintegration of Islamic morals because of Western influence. 
 The westernization that  al-Banna found so abhorrent in Cairo was the result  of decades of 
foreign intervention, first under the Ottoman Empire and then under the British, which played a 
significant role in Egypt’s modern history. The construction of the Suez Canal in November 1869 
guaranteed the continued intervention of the West in Egypt’s internal affairs, despite gaining 
autonomy from the Ottoman Empire in 1867. In 1882, the British occupied the country after the 
Arabi Rebellion in order to maintain political stability  and ensure economic solidity. This event 
exacerbated the political isolation of Egypt from its Arab neighbors. Egyptians were “daily torn 
between two worlds, that of the Muslim East and that of the Christian West.”4  Religious 
affiliations with the East remained, but Egypt looked to the West for material advancement. 
 The occupation lasted until 1914, when a protectorate was established under British 
authority. The war that followed and the increased involvement of foreign powers would create 
many hardships and social problems for the Egyptian people. Martial law, inflation, and the 
unequal distribution of wealth angered many peasants. British influence created social and 
economic divisions within Egyptian society. The upper and middle classes embraced the secular 
ideals of the West, separating them from the poor lower class that embraced Arab and Islamic 
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 3 Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1993), 144.
 4 Christina Phelps Harris, Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt: The Role of the Muslim 
Brotherhood (Westport: Hyperion Press, Inc., 1981), 66.
traditions.5  As a result, the twentieth century ushered in a period of renewed Egyptian 
nationalism which called for liberation from the British. Al-Banna, an ardent nationalist, was an 
active participant in the anti-British rebellion of 1919 and subsequent strikes and demonstrations. 
The revolt led to the unilateral declaration of Egyptian independence by the British government 
in February 1922.6 
 Al-Banna’s exposure to what he viewed as the degradation of Egyptian society caused by  
the harmful influence of Western ideals in Cairo left  a deep impression. He wrote extensively  of 
his experience in his memoirs:
I saw that the social life of the beloved Egyptian nations was 
oscillating between her dear and precious Islamism which she had 
inherited, defended, and lived with and became accustomed to, and 
made powerful during thirteen centuries, and this severe Western 
invasion which is armed and equipped with all the destructive and 
degenerative influences of money, wealth, prestige, ostentation, 
material enjoyment, power, and means of propaganda. 7 
The “spiritual and ideological degradation” and the “deterioration of behaviors, morals, and 
deeds” convinced him of the deleterious effects of westernization.8 He determined that while he 
attended Dar al-’Ulum, he would do his best to counteract this trend. He wrote, “I therefore 
decided upon positive action and I asked myself: Why do I not place this responsibility  upon the 
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 5 William L. Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East (Colorado: Westview Press, 
2004), 199.
 6 Harris, 144.
 7 Ibid., 146.
 8 Ibid.
shoulders of Muslim leaders and urge them strongly to co-operate in resisting this invasion?”9 
When he graduated in 1927, he vowed to become a teacher and religious guide. 
 Al-Banna was appointed by  the government to teach in Ismailia, where he again 
confronted the reality of imperial British and French influence in the Suez Canal Zone.10  In 
1928, al-Banna was solicited by a group of six men who were influenced by his teachings and 
lectures. Together they  formed Jama‘at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin, the Society  of the Muslim 
Brothers. The name was designated by al-Banna himself, who wrote that “we are brothers in the 
service of Islam; hence, we are the ‘Muslim Brothers.’”11 The initial goal of the society was to 
educate members in gaining the correct understanding of Islam, a goal which greatly  reflected 
the influence of Sufism on al-Banna’s life. He even assumed the Sufi title al-murshid al-amm 
(general guide).12 Within four years, the Brotherhood had branches along the length of the canal 
zone, including major cities such as Ismailia, Port Sa’id, Suez, and abu-Suwayr.13
 Al-Banna’s responsibilities brought him back to Cairo in 1932, where he set up  
headquarters for the Brotherhood and concentrated on recruiting members. After ten years, the 
ideological foundation of the organization was established. First, Islam was a total system that 
encompassed every aspect of life. At the Brotherhood’s fifth congress, al-Banna explained: 
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 9 Ibid.
 10 Ibid., 148.
 11 Mitchell, 8.
 12 Ana Belen Soage and Jorge Fuentelsaz Franganillo, The Muslim Brothers in Egypt. In 
The Muslim Brotherhood: The Organization and Policies of a Global Islamist Movement., ed. 
Barry Rubin (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 39.
 13 Mitchell, 9.
It is our conviction that the rulings and precepts of Islam are 
comprehensive and organize the affairs of this life and the next. 
Whoever believes that those precepts are only  concerned with worship 
and spirituality  is mistaken. Islam is creed and worship, country and 
nationality, religion and government, action and spirituality, Book and 
sword.14
According to Richard Mitchell, in addition to the totality of Islam, it was also formulated from 
and based on its two primary sources; the revelation in the Qur’an and the wisdom of the Prophet 
in the Sunna. Furthermore, it is “an Islam applicable to all times and to all places.”15 The scope 
of the movement attracted followers from every sector of Egyptian society. Al-Banna described it 
as “a Salafiyya message, a Sunni way, a Sufi truth, a political organization, an athletic group, a 
cultural-educational union, an economic company, and a social idea.”16 As a result of Al-Banna’s 
leadership and organizational ability, the Brotherhood was able to remain unified despite its 
internal factions and grow into the powerful organization it is today. 
Early Politicization
 The Muslim Brotherhood became involved in politics as early as the 1930s through 
protests and demonstrations demanding the implementation of shari’a (Islamic law). Most 
Brotherhood members were dismayed by the current government and its Western backers. King 
Farouk I, the son and successor of Faud I, came to the throne in 1937 as the world was poised on 
the brink of war. His government was a constitutional monarchy but the British, despite official 
independence, were heavily  involved in Egypt’s internal affairs. When King Farouk, for instance, 
showed sympathies towards the Axis powers in 1942, a pro-British premier was placed in office 
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 14 Soage, The Muslim Brothers in Egypt, 40.
 15 Mitchell, 14.
 16 Ibid.
to counter the King.17 Although his popularity was high at first, popular support decreased as his 
sixteen year reign progressed. His extravagant lifestyle and blatant  corruption outraged his 
subjects, alienating the Army, which had long been loyal to the throne. By the 1950s, he had lost 
the support of his international backers as well. Sir Miles Lampson, the British high 
commissioner, described him in a 1937 report to the Foreign Office as “uneducated, lazy, 
untruthful, capricious, irresponsible and vain, though with a quick superficial intelligence and 
charm of manner.”18  Relations between King Farouk and the Muslim Brotherhood would be 
uneasy because of his corrupt lifestyle and complicity with the British.
 The Brotherhood’s involvement in Palestinian resistance to the British mandate and pro-
Axis plotting during the war led to the arrest of al-Banna and his closest advisors, as well as the 
temporary interdiction of the organization. This marked the beginning of a progression of clashes 
with the authorities that continues to the present day. For the first time, the Brotherhood became 
actively hostile to the ruling powers in Egypt. The clashes with the government and growing 
hostility prompted al-Banna to create a secret paramilitary organization designated the Special 
Apparatus (al-jihaz al-sirri) or the Secret  Unit.19  It was established in late 1942 or early  1943 
and quickly became the movements’ defense against government police forces. The Special 
Apparatus was kept a secret from most members and remained relatively small in size but, by 
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 17 Richard Cavendish. “The Abdication of King Farouk,” History Today 52 no.7 (July 
2002): 55. http://web.ebscohost.com (accessed December 2, 2011).
 18 Ibid.
 19 Mitchell, 30.
1947, it had become a fully structured, equipped, and efficient body of the Muslim 
Brotherhood.20
 After WWII, the political landscape changed dramatically. Instability revealed problems 
with the parliamentary system. Skirmishes and assassinations had become common occurrences 
in the political life of the country. The Muslim Brotherhood emerged even stronger after the war 
because of its anti-British rhetoric and support  for Palestinian resistance, policies which endeared 
it to the growing nationalist movement. Schools and hospitals run by the Brotherhood also 
provided needed services for a large portion of the urban population that  suffered from war 
induced inflation and unemployment.21  A realignment of parties also took place. The secular 
Wafd party, weakened from its support of the British during the war, formed an alliance with the 
increasingly  popular communist party. Al-Banna’s disdain for both parties pushed him into an 
unlikely alliance with King Farouk, who provided financial support and wide latitude for the 
Brotherhood to disseminate their message.22  The alliance eventually broke down due to the 
actions of the Special Apparatus, which “contributed to the mayhem by  multiplying its attacks 
against the British, Egyptian Jews - accused of collusion with Zionism - and Egyptian public 
personalities,” such as Judge Ahmad al-Khazandar and Prime Minister Mahmud al-Nuqrashi.23 
Although al-Banna condemned the violence, he was assassinated by the secret police on 
February 12, 1949. In that year, the Brotherhood was officially banned and labelled a terrorist 
organization.
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 20 Ibid., 54.
 21 Soage, The Muslim Brothers in Egypt, 40.
 22 Ibid.
 23 Ibid.
Al-Banna’s Ideological Contribution
 The ideological contributions of al-Banna to the Muslim Brothers would last until the 
present. As the society’s founder, his views on Islam, democracy, violence, and political 
participation would set precedents for subsequent leaders. His concept of Islam as a complete 
system and his goal of establishing shari’a in Egypt remain the primary goals of the society. The 
legacy of violence that precedes the Muslim Brotherhood today was initially established by al-
Banna, although at the time the Special Apparatus was created, it was a common practice for 
political organizations to possess paramilitary groups. 
 Many scholars who study  the Brotherhood during the 1930s and 1940s believe that the 
height of violence by the society was caused by the actions of an independent Special Apparatus. 
Barbara Zollner writes that because the influence of Abd al-Rahman al-Sanadi and Salih al-
Ashmawi, the head and former head of the Special Apparatus, was growing steadily, “there is a 
question as to whether al-Banna really retained control over the Secret Unit.”24  If this was the 
case, it would explain al-Banna’s denial of involvement in plans to overthrow the government 
while also acknowledging that some Brothers were involved in terrorist activities.25 In fact, al-
Banna condemned the destabilizing episodes of violence which some members took part in. In 
1949, after the bombing of a court house by  members of the Secret Unit, al-Banna declared that 
“they are neither Brothers, nor are they Muslims.”26 This violent past would create a measure of 
uncertainty regarding the Muslim Brotherhood’s intentions in the future.
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 24 Barbara H. E. Zollner, The Muslim Brotherhood: Hasan al-Hudaybi and Ideology 
(London: Routledge, 2009), 14.
 25 Ibid.
 26 Mitchell, 68.
 The Brotherhood’s early views on democracy and political participation were established 
by al-Banna. Early  observations of the secular Wafd Party convinced al-Banna that pluralism and 
parties were divisive and harmful. To him, parties were unconcerned with the welfare of the 
people and rooted in personal disputes rather than political problems. He wrote that:
Even though it  is viable in some countries, it is not feasible in Egypt at 
all. Especially at this time when a new era has begun, we have to 
cooperate, join forces, make use of all talents to build a strong nation. 
We need firm stability and complete devotion to all aspects of 
reforms.27
The Muslim Brotherhood’s appeal to the masses and their criticism of party politics were 
important components in Egypt’s transition from a clientelistic and elite-dominated system, to 
mass politicization and the formations of ideological parties.28  Furthermore, he considered 
democracy  an import of the West and alien to Islamic culture and society. He did believe, 
however, that leaders should be held accountable to the people. He stressed that “Islam has 
enjoined, confirmed and recommended the principle that power belongs to the nation. The 
Muslims should be supervising the acts of their government, giving advice and support and 
holding them accountable.”29  These views kept the Brotherhood officially out of politics until a 
later date and played a large role in the ideological split  between the new and old guard in the 
1970s.
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 27 Brynjar Lia, The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt : The Rise of an Islamic Mass 
Movement, 1928-1942 (Reading, England: Ithaca Press, 1998), 203.
 28 Ibid., 205.
 29 Ibid., 203.
Dissolution and the Struggles of Succession
 Al-Banna’s assassination created a multitude of problems for the Muslim Brotherhood. 
He had been their charismatic leader for decades, attracting followers with his charm, eloquent 
speeches, and command of the native tongue.30  After al-Banna’s death, power struggles 
dominated the inner workings of the society. The issue of succession was one area where internal 
divisions were clearly present. The Muslim Brotherhood was on the brink of destruction, existing 
underground with no elected leader. The difficulty  of bringing the necessary members of the 
Consultative Assembly together and the divisions within the society’s ranks prevented the 
election of a new general guide for several years. 
 The leading candidates were al-Ashmawi, Abd al-Hakim Abidin, Abd al-Rahman al-
Banna, Shaykh Hasab al-Baquri and Mustafa Mu’min, who each represented different 
ideological positions within the Brotherhood. An open debate between the candidates, however, 
“would have exposed the intended public appearance of a unified and coherent organization as 
not being genuine,” even though the internal rift was already considerable.31 The primary  rivalry 
reflected two vastly different positions. Salih al-Ashmawi, al-Banna’s deputy and former head of 
the Secret Unit, was considered the rightful successor by many Brothers because of his role in 
keeping morale high during the period of dissolution. He was a proponent of the militant and 
ideologically  radical arm of the Muslim Brotherhood. Mustafa Mu’min, on the other hand, 
championed a more democratic distribution of power and was ideologically similar to the 
Wafd.32 
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 30 Harris, 150.
 31 Zollner, 17.
 32 Ibid.
 To preserve the unity  of the organization, which was struggling to maintain its existence 
in the face of government repression, the election of the next general guide had to be approached 
with caution. Elections would not be held until 1951, when the end of martial law created a 
semblance of normalcy  that permitted the Consultative Assembly to meet. The leading figures in 
the movement, however, were still associated with the ignominy of violence and internal 
dissension. As a result, Hasan Isma‘il al-Hudaybi, an esteemed judge and a relatively unknown 
Brother, was chosen because of his ties to the royal regime, relative anonymity, and 
respectability.33 
 Choosing a compromise candidate maintained the appearance of unity within the 
Brotherhood. Al-Ashmawi would later state that “it was necessary that the names of the 
terrorists, which had been made by  the press the subject of stories of fear and terror, should 
disappear for a while.”34  Al-Hudaybi’s nomination signified support within the society  for re-
legalization and cooperation with the government, as well as a move away  from violence. One of 
his first moves as general guide was to dissolve the Special Apparatus, which he abhorred for its 
secrecy, legacy of violence, and destruction between 1946-49.35  When told that the Special 
Apparatus was necessary to maintain the security of the organization and its principles, he 
responded that “there is no secrecy in the service of God. There is no secrecy in the Message and 
no terrorism in religion.”36  His insistence on nonviolence at a time when the government was 
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 33 Ibid.
 34 Mitchell, 85.
 35 Zollner, 23.
 36 Mitchell, 88.
threatening their destruction would anger many  Brothers at the time, but would eventually be 
adopted and accepted by the majority of the movement. 
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CHAPTER TWO
THE BROTHERS AND THE FREE OFFICERS: 1952-1970
 The violence that erupted in the years following WWII is considered to be a contributing 
factor in the revolution of 1952. Mitchell claims that  the violence was the “beginning of the final 
phase” of the collapse of parliamentary  life and the rule of law in Egypt.37 It is widely  believed 
that the Muslim Brotherhood played a significant role in the revolution. The exact role is 
unknown because the government made every attempt to deny the relation when the organization 
was eventually outlawed by Nasser. Several memoirs from leading figures on the Revolutionary 
Command Council describe a close relationship  with the Special Apparatus and al-Banna. Those 
memoirs also show that Anwar al-Sadat, Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser, and Muhammad Naguib, 
prominent leaders of the Free Officers, were personally  acquainted with al-Banna. Some authors 
even argue that Sadat, Nasser, and Naguib were actually  members of the organization, which 
would imply that the Muslim Brotherhood actually  instigated the whole revolution.38 Even if the 
Muslim Brothers were not instigators of the coup, many Brothers and Free Officers fought 
together in the war for Palestinian liberation and shared a mutual respect for one another. Salah 
Shadi, al-Ashmawi. and ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Sanadi were three Brotherhood leaders who directly 
participated in the revolution. 
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 37 Ibid., 59.
 38 Zollner, 26.
 Despite controversy over the extent of the Brotherhood’s role in the revolution, the fact 
that they provided support is undeniable. Some of the responsibilities designated to the 
Brotherhood before the coup, according to Richard Mitchell, included protecting foreigners, 
foreign establishments, and minorities in the event that certain groups sought to take advantage 
of the revolutionary fervor. They were to provide intelligence on possible enemies and, in the 
event of failed popular support, Brothers would rally the people behind the Free Officers. In the 
event that fighting broke out, the Brotherhood would join in and help maintain security and order 
or, in the case of failure, help secure the safe passage of escaping Free Officers. This was to be 
accomplished through the use of the Muslim Brotherhood’s ‘civil army.’39 Although the quick 
success of the coup rendered many of the society’s responsibilities unnecessary, the 
Brotherhood’s role was still significant. One account states that “without the enthusiastic support 
of the Moslem Brotherhood, Mohammad Naguib’s movement might already  have met the fate of 
the half dozen Egyptian governments that preceded it in the year 1952. The Brotherhood was a 
full participant in Naguib’s coup last summer and much of his success since then can be 
attributed to . . . . their support.”40 Whatever the role of the Brotherhood in the revolution, their 
widespread influence and enormous support base would ensure continued relations between the 
two, at least for the first year.
 Relations between the new government and the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood were 
good at  first. Five days after the revolution, al-Hudaybi met  with Naguib and a general letter was 
circulated to members to show support for the movement. Even though political parties were 
banned in 1953, the Muslim Brotherhood was permitted to continue operating as an organization. 
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 39 Mitchell, 102.
 40 Ibid., 101.
Early on, however, the new regime began to recognize the society as a potential threat. In one 
account recorded in the Mideast Mirror, Naguib’s tour of Egypt was marked by the presence of 
Brotherhood supporters: 
There was. . . evidence everywhere of the activity  of the Moslem 
Brotherhood. The chanting calls for General Naguib and the army 
were frequently  interspersed with purely religious chants from 
organized groups of the Brotherhood and in some places there were 
pictures of the murdered Brotherhood leader Hasan al-Banna and cries 
in support of him.41 
The two had irreconcilable differences that, while tolerable at first, would eventually  create a 
wedge between them. 
 The Muslim Brotherhood “saw in the officers an instrument to realize their vision of an 
Islamic state, whereas the [new government] wanted to turn the Brothers into the grassroots they 
lacked.”42  When offered positions within the government, the Brotherhood turned them down 
because they feared the loss of popular support and the inevitability of having to put their name 
on legislation that was against their ideology. Eventually, relations soured and the Muslim 
Brothers joined forces with other opposition movements to demand a return to civilian rule. The 
attempted assassination of Nasser in October 1954 by  a young Brother gave the regime the 
opportunity to move against the Brotherhood, imprisoning and torturing tens of thousands of 
members before putting them on trial.43 Among those arrested were al-Hudaybi, who received a 
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 41 Harris, 213.
 42 Soage, The Muslim Brothers in Egypt, 41.
 43 Ibid., 41.
life sentence, and Sayyid Qutb, whose writings would inspire the creation of violent offshoot 
groups.44
Sayyid Qutb and Hasan Isma‘il al-Hudaybi
 Sayyid Qutb is worth mentioning because of the enormous influence he had on Islamist 
groups in the region, including a portion of the Brotherhood. He is often associated by  the West 
with violent Islamists and many Western scholars question how much his rhetoric contributes to 
Brotherhood ideology today.45 Qutb was a leading figure in the society throughout the 1940s and 
50s and was even offered a leadership position in the Liberation Rally, Nasser’s first attempt at 
creating a single party  system.46 He was arrested in the purge that resulted from the attempted 
assassination of Nasser in 1954 and spent almost the rest of his life in prison. While in prison, his 
ideology first turned towards extremism and he produced many  of the works he is most known 
for today. In 1966, he was executed after being convicted of leading a terrorist organization, 
making him a martyr in the eyes of his followers. 
 His book Ma‘lim fi al-Tariq (Milestones) is considered a theological guidebook for 
radical Islamist groups. Qutb emphasizes the Muslim’s obligation to counteract all non-Islamic 
influences and establish Allah’s absolute authority on earth.47 His ideology boils down to two 
concepts: Jahiliyya (ignorance) and Jihad (struggle). In terms of jahiliyya, all governments that 
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Brotherhood,” Texas International Law Journal 46, issue 1 (Fall 2010): 77, http://web.ebscohost
.com (accessed August 2011).
 45 Zollner, 50.
 46 Soage, The Muslim Brothers in Egypt, 41.
 47 Ibid., 56.
do not abide by shari’a law are jahili. Qutb wrote, “There is no intermediate state half-Islam and 
half-jahiliyya that Islam can accept. . . . Either God’s government or jahiliyya government. Either 
God’s Shari’a or human caprice.”48  To oppose jahili forces,which will resist losing their own 
power and authority, jihad is necessary to establish Allah’s power on earth. Qutb wrote:
Anyone who understands this particular character of the din will also 
understand the purpose of jihad bil saif (striving by the sword), which 
is to clear the way for freedom to strive through preaching in support 
of the Islamic movement.49
His writings avoid discussing the formal institutions that would create an ideal Islamic state 
because he believed that, when the time came to create one, true believers would instinctively 
understand divine will and know what was necessary. His writings, however, clearly indicate that 
the Islamic state would have the characteristics of a totalitarian regime, including a strong leader 
(qiyada) as a source of ultimate authority and a rigid interpretation of shari’a that is both 
restrictive and fixed.50
 Qutb’s influence was opposed primarily by al-Hudaybi. His well-known book, Du’at la 
Qudat (Preachers not Judges), outlines his interpretation of Islam and how it applies to the 
concept of an Islamic state. While Qutb considered all societies jahiliyya, al-Hudaybi considered 
them in a state of juhl, a term derived from the same stem but indicating a state of ignorance that 
can be remedied by preaching, not violent opposition.51 Al-Hudaybi takes a clear stance in favor 
of a minimal definition of principles and requirements for belief. For example, verbal profession, 
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in the form of the shahada, and inner convictions are the only requirements of belief; and those 
cannot be judged by anyone but God. This eliminates the connection between faith and action 
which is “close to the radical assumption that activism is part of the category of ‘ibadat 
(religious observances).”52  Most  importantly, he discusses his view of an Islamist state under 
shari’a. He uses “well-established juridical opinions to refute the radical attitude of other 
Muslim Brothers.”53  He takes a negative approach to the topic, choosing to refute the radical 
arguments of Islamist scholars that  consider political action and violent opposition inescapable. 
He promoted peaceful, nonviolent resistance as the solution to creating an Islamist state. 
Although al-Hudaybi has always been tainted by his association with the period of near defeat 
for the society, his ideology provided the foundation of nonviolent opposition that dominates 
Brotherhood ideology today. 
Egypt Under Nasser
 The repression of the Brotherhood during Nasser’s persecution did not  decimate the 
society as it had intended. It is estimated that membership levels stood at around 250,000 and 
300,000 during the height  of Nasserist oppression.54 Nasser’s rise to the presidency in 1956 after 
ousting Naguib did, however, lead to drastic changes within Egyptian society. He nationalized 
the economy, placing control in the hands of the state. Most notably, he nationalized the Suez 
Canal. His expansion of the state extended to free education at all levels and public sector jobs 
for all university graduates. The public sector would account for 35% of the gross domestic 
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product (GDP) during his rule.55  He banned political parties and created a number of 
organizations or national rallies, such as the Liberation Rally (1953), the National Union (1956), 
and the Arab Socialist  Union (1961). These were intended to maintain a monopoly on legitimate 
political activity.56
 Nasser’s foreign policy was as aggressive as his domestic agenda. His policy of 
nonalignment in Cold War politics and his aggression towards Israel made him popular within 
Egypt and in other Arab nations. It also created many conflicts. The nationalization of the Suez 
Canal sparked international conflict with Britain, France, and Israel in 1956. Although Egypt was 
defeated militarily, Nasser’s status as an Arab leader grew and British and French dominance in 
the region diminished.57 Egypt also went to war with Israel in 1967 after closing the Straits of 
Tiran to Israeli shipping. Known as the Six Day War, Israel preemptively  struck on June 5, 
destroying Egypt’s airfields within three hours, and by June 8, Egypt had agreed to a cease-fire.58 
The war was devastating for Egypt, who lost the entire Sinai Peninsula and was facing grave 
economic, political, and social conditions. The economy had stagnated, which meant that  fewer 
jobs were available for university graduates. It also resulted in the belief that Egypt’s defeat  was 
“God’s punishment” for the regime’s deviation from religion and its suppression of Islamists.59 
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In this political atmosphere, the Brotherhood was able to reemerge on the Egyptian political 
scene with renewed vigor and popular support.
 26
CHAPTER THREE
REEMERGENCE UNDER SADAT AND MUBARAK: 1970-2010
 The succession of Anwar Sadat to the presidency in 1970 ushered in a period of political 
and religious opening. The new president rejected the socialist  economy championed by Nasser, 
as well as his foreign policy initiatives. In particular, he improved relations with the U.S. and 
Israel, which had suffered greatly under Nasser. Sadat actively sought closer relations with the 
U.S. by  dismissing Soviet military  advisors and accepting foreign aid in exchange for a peace 
treaty with Israel. The Camp David Accords, signed on September 17, 1978, was the first peace 
accord signed by Israel and one of its Arab neighbors. It resulted in Egypt’s recognition of 
Israel’s right to exist and a cessation of hostilities between the two countries. In return, Israel 
returned the Sinai, which had been lost in Six Day War, and agreed to future negotiations 
regarding the rights of the Palestinian people. Further efforts to realign with the West led Sadat 
to undertake limited democratic opening and institute a policy of infitah (economic 
liberalization) in 1974. He embraced religion in an effort to undermine Nasserist and leftist 
opposition forces and as a means of obtaining legitimacy. He released many Brothers held as 
political prisoners and allowed opposition parties to become semi-participants in national 
politics. This period of liberalization allowed the Brothers to reestablish themselves as political 
actors. 60
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 Umar al-Tilmisani, a lawyer by training and general guide from 1973 to 1986, was vital 
in bringing about change in the ideology of the Brotherhood. He advocated the end of violence 
as a means of opposition.61 Al-Tilmisani explained:
We are indifferent to the person of our ruler, for what matters most to 
us is the type of government, its form and constitution. If what it 
means by haraka (the movement) is to confront the regime by force 
and violence, then we believe that this is a futile use of the people’s 
strength which benefits no one but the enemies of this country.62 
He believed that until shari’a was applied to the state, conflict between the ruling regime and the 
Muslim Brotherhood would be unavoidable. Causing physical destruction and perpetuating 
violence “is the business only of those who seek power for its own sake,” rather than God’s 
will.63 As a result, “the burning of means of transport, the looting of shops, and the pillaging of 
public establishments” achieves nothing except  injury to the Egyptian people.64 He placed great 
emphasis on the need for legality and official recognition by the regime. He explained that the 
regime denies the Brotherhood “legal status,” and despite continued calls “for the restoration of 
our rights,” the society has “receive[d] no answer.”65  The goals of the Brotherhood under al-
Tilmisani were to reestablish and structurally rebuild itself after the dissolution and repression of 
the past decades.66  
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 The hope of regaining legal status died when the period of cooperation with Sadat ended. 
Sadat halted his move towards a more democratic system when he faced heightened opposition 
to many of his policies. The Muslim Brotherhood protested Sadat’s state visit to Israel in 1977 
and criticized his peace initiatives at the Camp David Accords. The Muslim Brotherhood had 
long harbored anti-Israeli sentiment because of Israel’s treatment of fellow Palestinian Muslims 
and the history of war between the two nations. Sadat’s peace overtures also alienated ordinary 
Egyptians, who viewed the Accords as treason, and galvanized radical Islamists to “overthrow 
the kafir (apostate) regime.”67  According to Ibrahim, opposition also turned towards Sadat’s 
liberal economic policy, limited democratization, and cooperation with the U.S.68 In 1979, the 
regime cracked down on both Islamists and secular opposition. The Brotherhood’s openly hostile 
position towards Egypt’s treaty with Israel culminated in mass arrests of Brothers, including al-
Tilmisani. Sadat was eventually assassinated on October 6, 1981, by a disgruntled member of 
Islamic Jihad (al-Jihad), a radical offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood.69
Political Renewal
 Hosni Mubarak, like Sadat, initially tried to establish good relations with the Brotherhood 
when he rose to the presidency. The 1970s revealed divisions within the Islamist movement; 
organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood adopted a reformist view while others, such as 
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Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Group (al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya) became militant.70  Mubarak 
viewed radical Islamists as the greatest  threat to Egypt and hoped that he could negate their 
influence by mobilizing moderate groups like the Muslim Brothers. Within the first year, he 
released hundreds of Brothers from prison. He also initiated regular, albeit flawed, multi-party 
elections and allowed a certain degree of freedom of the press.71  This brief period of 
liberalization was marred by the continued existence of the ‘state of emergency’ law, which made 
it legal for the regime to detain prisoners without trial, prohibit demonstrations, and enact laws 
through presidential decree.72 
 The Muslim Brotherhood made massive strides during this second liberalization period 
towards greater participation in the formal political realm. Al-Tilmisani’s renunciation of 
violence pushed the Brotherhood into the realm of politics in a new and more significant way. He 
transformed the society into a civil organization that provided social services, which gained the 
support of non-Islamists. Under his leadership, the Brotherhood gained control of student unions, 
teachers clubs, and labor unions. Elections for these organizations were among the freest  allowed 
in Egypt at the time and the Brotherhood’s victory shocked many liberal and secular circles.73 
These professional unions were important because they provided new graduates with access to 
the saturated job market, as well as loans, subsidies, and health insurance. The Doctor’s Union 
came under Brotherhood control in 1984, the Pharmacist’s Union in 1985, the Engineer’s Union 
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in 1986, and the Lawyers’ Association in 1992.74  These important organizations, whose boards 
were soon dominated by Brothers, would provide the Muslim Brotherhood with a legitimate 
platform to participate in the political life of the country. 
  Al-Tilmisani’s influence also inaugurated the society’s gradual transition into 
mainstream national politics through the formation of political alliances. The society was still 
forbidden from participating legally  in formal political contests, but forming alliances with legal 
parties circumvented this restriction. First, in 1984, the Muslim Brothers joined forces with their 
former rivals, the secular Wafd Party, where they won 15% of the vote with eight seats solely 
belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood. Although opposition to this alliance rose within the ranks 
of the society on ideological grounds, al-Tilmisani defended his choice by  claiming that “the 
Wafd is a legal conduit and the Brotherhood has a popular base, so what is wrong with them 
coordinating in this area to bring about good?”75 In 1987, an Islamic Alliance was reached with 
the Socialist Labor Party and the Liberal Party under the slogan al-Islam huwa al-hall (Islam is 
the Solution).76 Their platform stressed accommodation and promised gradual implementation of 
shari’a. The Islamic Alliance succeeded in gaining 17% of the vote with 36 seats belonging to 
the Brotherhood.77 
 These early successes in national elections did not, at  first, prompt the government to 
respond with force. The U.S Agency of International Development inferred at the time:
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The Mubarak government . . . clearly prefers to use the tactic of 
repression sparingly, and by regional standards, successfully limits its 
recourse to ‘the stick.’ Whether from calculation or conviction, the 
government is committed to a process of consultation with important 
social actors and of political reform. The government’s style, in 
marked contrast to that of its predecessors, has been one of consensus 
building.78
The Mubarak government did not remain lenient for long, however, because of the 
Brotherhood’s increased ability to challenge the legitimacy of the regime. The Brotherhood 
openly  clashed with the regime by boycotting the 1990 parliamentary election, undermining the 
facade of democracy Mubarak had constructed. The Gulf War and the Algerian Civil War added 
to his concern over the Muslim Brotherhood’s growing role in Egyptian society. 
 The attempted assassination of Mubarak in Sudan in 1995 lead to accusations of the 
Brotherhood’s cooperation with radical Islamist  groups, despite their condemnation of the 
attacks. Repressive measures were adopted and a fierce media campaign was launched to tarnish 
the Brotherhood’s reputation. Interestingly, the regime reversed its initial position and attempted 
to associate the Muslim Brotherhood with militant  Islamist groups. This allowed further 
justification for the emergency law and the denial of party  status, both of which prevented the 
“radical Islamists” from gaining state power. Legislation was passed which brought most 
professional syndicates under the authority of the state through government-appointed judicial 
committees. A total of 54 Brothers were sent  to prison by military tribunal and thousands were 
arrested without charge.79  The parliamentary election of 1995 was the most violent since 
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Mubarak took office and resulted in the National Democratic Party (NDP) winning a 94% 
majority.80 
Internal Divisions: The New and Old Guard
 Electoral politics of the 1980s were instrumental in transforming the Brotherhood from a 
conservative social organization into a progressive political force. Not all Brothers were 
interested in seeing the organization move in this direction. Internal rifts, which had their origins 
in the period after al-Banna’s death and had been developing since Sadat’s liberalization policies, 
divided the Brotherhood on the issue of greater participation in the political arena. The old guard 
retained al-Banna’s opinion of pluralism and a conservative view on the rights of women and 
Coptic Christians. They focused on proselytizing, rather than politics. They  shared a common 
identity  due to shared experiences of persecution and imprisonment. The new guard, also 
referred to as the Generation of 1970, was made up of a younger generation of Brothers more in 
tune with modern society. They objected to the lack of democracy in the internal decision 
making process of the society and the isolation of the Brotherhood. They  possessed modern 
views towards pluralism, women, and Copts.81 
 Some scholars, like Mona el-Ghobashy, considered this rift unimportant. Others, such as 
Sawsan al-Jayyar, go so far as to claim fundamental differences over the source of authority; the 
old guard based sole authority in shari’a while the new guard considered authority to rest with 
the umma, or community of believers.82  While al-Tilmisani’s support of nonviolence and his 
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support of rising new guards to leadership positions was opposed by members of the old guard, 
his guidance helped bridge the gap between the two groups.83 After al-Tilmisani’s death in 1986, 
the old guard was able to reestablish its primacy within the Brotherhood. The general guides that 
followed, Hamid Abu al-Nasr (1986-96), Mustafa Mash’hur (1996-2002), and Ma’mun al-
Hudaybi (2002-2004), were members of the old guard and left the new guard feeling both 
deprived and displaced. The result was a divided organization that contained both liberal and 
conservative influences struggling to come to terms in a modern political environment. 
 These internal divisions became apparent in 1996 with the creation of a new offshoot of 
the Muslim Brotherhood. Abu al-Ila Madi, a member of the new guard, applied to register Hizb 
al-Wasat (the middle way) as a party without the permission of the general guide. Stacher writes 
that “the Wasat members’ desire to participate formally in politics overrode support of da’wa of 
the Muslim Brotherhood. In this sense, they pragmatically  chose to become Islamist politicians, 
rather than restrict their roles to that of activists in the Brotherhood.”84 The official explanation 
behind the Muslim Brotherhood’s rejection of the party was that it was not the right time to form 
a political party. Scholars such as Ana Belen Soage believe that, in reality, the old guard factions 
within the organization feared losing members to a new party.85 
 Hizb al-Wasat pursued a more moderate approach to politics than their conservative 
leaders. Using the example of legal Islamist  parties in countries such as Turkey and Jordan, they 
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promoted transparency, accountability, and legal status within the Egyptian political system.86 
Hizb al-Wasat applied for legal status on two occasions, once in 1996 and another in 1998, but 
was denied by the government both times on the grounds that it added nothing new to the 
political landscape. The party, however, was granted the status of a nonprofit  organization. Since 
then, it has gained the support  of many secular forces within the country, “who see them as 
representing a moderate and enlightened form of political Islam.”87 
Yusef al-Qaradawi and Wasatiyya
 An important influence on the founders of Hizb al-Wasat was Shaykh Yusef al-Qaradawi, 
a popular Islamic theologian and ideologue of the Brotherhood. He was born in 1926 and 
belonged to the organization for several decades before leaving to pursue nonpartisan studies. 
The Muslim Brotherhood, however, still considers him a key thinker and his works are often 
required reading for members. He is known for his views on extremism, wasatiyya (middle way 
or moderation), and civil government. Extremism, he believes, is the failure of Muslim societies 
to adhere to Islam, leading youths to justify violence by misinterpreting the Qur’an. Al-Qaradawi 
stated:
Extremism reached its utmost limit when a single group deprives all 
people of the right to safety and protection, and instead sanctions their 
killing and the confiscation of their lives and property. This, of course, 
occurs when an extremist holds all people - except  those in this group - 
to be kuffar (nonbeliever). This kind of extremism severs any bond 
between such a person and the rest of the Ummah.88
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He was especially  critical of Qutb and his teachings on belief and unbelief, which many  scholars, 
such as Barbara Zollner, consider the distinction between moderates and radicals.
 The concept of wasatiyya makes him an appealing ideologue for the Muslim Brothers 
and accounts for his popularity among the Egyptian people.89  Wasatiyya was coined by al-
Qaradawi as early  as the 1990s. He summarizes it as “the balance between mind and the 
Revelation, matter and spirit, rights and duties, individualism and collectivism, inspiration and 
commitment, the Text and personal interpretation, the ideal and reality, the permanent and the 
transient, relying on the past and looking forward to the future.”90 The influence that this concept 
had on young Brothers is evident in the name Hizb al-Wasat. His movement advocated 
“conservatism without rigidity  and combines pragmatism with idealism.”91  The concept is the 
foundation of al-Qaradawi’s views on an Islamic state, which have been internalized by the 
Brotherhood.
The Brotherhood’s Success in the 21st Century
 Though the Muslim Brotherhood was unable to make significant  gains in parliamentary 
elections during the 1990s, the period of repression and de-liberalization came to an end at the 
turn of the century. In 2005, due to changes made to electoral laws, the presidential election 
would include multiple candidates. Unfortunately, the election in September 2005 contained 
many irregularities and a low voter turnout. Mubarak would win the contest for president with 
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90% of the vote. The parliamentary  elections took place in November and December of that year. 
The first round of elections was relatively free and fair. However, violence, intimidation, and 
fraud carried out by  the security forces characterized the second round as the regime’s growing 
fear of Brotherhood successes materialized.92  In the end, the regime’s underhanded tactics 
prevented the NDP from losing its majority  in parliament. The Brotherhood was still able to win 
20% of the seats in the lower house or 88 out of 444.93 The Brotherhood’s success at the polls in 
2005 confirmed the society’s political aspirations. As El-Ghobashy wrote, the Brotherhood 
“morphed from a highly secretive, hierarchal, antidemocratic organization led by anointed elders 
into a modern, multivocal political association steered by educated, savvy professionals not 
unlike activists of the same age in rival Egyptian political parties.”94 
 The Muslim Brotherhood’s rise in popularity among the population is attributed to its 
political tactics, organizational capacity, and social welfare services. The Brotherhood evaded 
provoking the regime by tactically avoiding contingencies that would pose too much of a threat. 
For this reason, they only fielded candidates in regions where they had the best chance of 
winning. In 2005, they fielded 161 candidates, only  challenging the NDP for one-third of the 
seats.95 In addition, they  constructed strategic plans to account for the imprisonment of leaders or 
candidates. In terms of organization, the society  was structured with a strict chain of command 
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that ran from the families at the bottom to the general guide at the top.96 They operated a clean, 
highly  efficient campaign based on the work of volunteers and local coordinators. Deputy 
general guide Mohammad Habib said that “rather than plastering districts with religious posters 
and slogans, Brotherhood candidates will establish direct  contact with voters through visiting 
their homes and canvasing with families one at a time.”97 The Brotherhood is also well funded by 
wealthy donors abroad and at home, as well as through membership fees.98 
 Finally, the success of the Muslim Brotherhood can be found in its support at the 
grassroots level, because of its emphasis on welfare services and its process of ‘Islamization 
from below.’ They  offer social services to a large portion of the population that the national or 
provincial governments are unable or unwilling to provide. These services generate support from 
non-Islamists, as well as Islamists. The Muslim Brotherhood provides education, healthcare, and 
employment through a wide network of social and charitable NGO’s, that benefitted different 
segments of society, including the rural sector. It is estimated that  the Muslim Brotherhood 
controls 20% of active NGO’s in Egypt.99 The adoption of ‘Islamization from below’ advocates 
Islam as a sources of social and national progress. Lack of participation and freedom of 
expression in the political system before the revolution has led to the emergence of a new form 
of religious expression, which benefits the Muslim Brotherhood, who has been given credit for 
the “Islamic renaissance.”100
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE COMPATIBILITY OF ISLAMIC LAW AND  DEMOCRACY
 The period of tolerance permitted by both Sadat  and Mubarak in the early  years of their 
regimes allowed the Brotherhood to undergo a crucial transition in ideology and political views. 
This transition has been the subject  of much scholarship in recent years. Differing opinions have 
surfaced about whether or not the transition to democracy is genuine or if the Muslim 
Brotherhood are only using democracy to achieve their own end.  Rachel Ehrenfeld, the director 
of the New York based American Center for Democracy, writes in “The Muslim Brotherhood 
Evolution” that the Brotherhood “uses Western democratic rules to gain inroads” and that their 
“made-up benevolent public image” is a front obscuring its real intentions.101  She makes a 
further comparison that “the Brotherhood’s successful campaign to deceive the West seems to 
incorporate time-tested techniques used by  some of the world’s most successful totalitarian 
regimes.”102  Kristen Stilt, however, focuses on the Brotherhood’s platform for constitutional 
change and the probability of Islam being defined and enforced by state institutions. If 
implemented, the Brotherhood’s platform “differs little from a political party in the United States 
that favors a particular interpretation of a provision of the U.S. Constitution and advances it 
through all appropriate possible mechanisms.”103
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 Saad Eddin Ibrahim, the founder and chairman of the Ibn Khaldun Centre for 
Development Studies and author of “Toward Muslim Democracies,” holds that “to enlist 
Islamists under the flag of democracy” is a crucial step  towards making Egypt a democratic 
state.104  The Muslim Brotherhood’s participation in the political system through legitimate 
democratic means “further ties the Islamists to the system of electoral competition,” which he 
believes will be beneficial in promoting the future of democracy  in Egypt.105 He goes further to 
suggest that “the Koran and other Muslim religious texts contain nothing that bars democracy  or 
liberty,” and that the concept of shura, or consultation, is the same thing as competitive 
elections.106 
 Yusef al-Qaradawi holds that  the idea of an Islamic state is compatible with a democracy 
because the model established by Muhammad and his successors provides little guidance in this 
modern age. His conception of an Islamic state in Egypt would be civil rather than religious. The 
leader would be constrained by  elections, consultation of the umma, and the shari’a. His basis 
for a civil state stems from the belief that Islam is a comprehensive system, a concept that al-
Banna championed during his life. In order for Islam to be fully  comprehensive, it must include 
political institutions, law, and economics. He endorsed participation in a multiparty system:
I am aware that the martyred Hasan al-Banna deplored partisan life 
and the establishment of parties in Islam due to what he witnessed in 
his time of parties that divided the umma in confronting the enemy. 
They  were parties that revolved around individuals instead of clear 
goals and platforms. It is all right if our interpretation differs from 
that of our Imam, may God have compassion on him, for he did not 
disallow those who came after him to have their own interpretations, 
 40
 104 Ibrahim, “Toward Muslim Democracies,” 10.
 105 Ibid., 11.
 106 Ibid., 12.
especially if circumstances change and positions and ideas evolve. 
Perhaps if he lived till today he would see what we see. Fatwas 
change with changing times, places, and conditions, especially in 
ever-changing political affairs. Those who knew Hasan al-Banna 
know that he was not rigid but developed his ideas and policies 
according to the evidence available to him.107
He focuses on Islamic constitutionalism as the formula for enacting a civil state based on shari’a 
law.108
 In “Institutions Make the Difference,” Laith Kubba, a director for the Middle East and 
North Africa at the National Endowment for Democracy, agrees that Islamist groups that come to 
power through democratic means will uphold democracy. However, it  will only be true if they 
come to power through a slow process of institution building and moderation that  will establish 
rules to safeguard democracy. He writes that “Islamist groups will be at their most radicalized 
and dangerous at times of social upheaval in states that suffer from the terrible combination of 
weak institutions and no limit on power.”109 In this article, he is referring to the great fear held in 
the West that the Muslim Brotherhood will create a theocracy similar to Iran if revolution is their 
means to power. He does stipulate that when “faced with the sustained challenge of having to 
operate within a robustly democratic process (such as Egypt now lacks), the Brotherhood with 
either modify its views or give way to a new generation of moderate Islamic groups.”110
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 Tarek Masoud argues in “Are They Democrats? Does it Matter?” that the Brotherhood is not 
poised to take over the government as soon as the opportunity arises because its success is only 
due to social projects and lacks any real competition from liberal parties. Like Kubba, Masoud 
believes that strong institutions are the safeguards of democracy and that the strengthening of 
liberal secular parties is crucial for counteracting the presence of Islamist ideology. He writes 
that liberal parties and other institutions, such as the Army, will provide enough pressure to 
prevent the Muslim Brotherhood from subverting democracy, whether or not “liberal democracy 
resides in their hearts.”111
 Scholars, such as Eric Trager and Ira Weiner, have a less optimistic view of Islamist 
intentions in Egypt. Trager and Weiner state that the Muslim Brotherhood should not be 
permitted to gain strength because “despite the Brothers’ insistence that their goals are 
‘moderate,’ they seem to define this word differently  than how one would in the West.”112 
Moderate to Islamists, he holds, is only a renunciation of terrorism and the promise not to work 
with jihadists.113  Barbara Zollner writes about moderation and the origins of the ideology of 
nonviolence in her assessment of Hasan al-Hudaybi. She demonstrates how al-Hudaybi’s 
ideology paved the way for advocates of nonviolence, such as Umar al-Tilmisani, Hamid Abu al-
Nasr, and Mustafa Mashhur. Al-Hudaybi’s path “is now followed by  today’s Muslim 
Brotherhood, which endeavors to be recognized as a political party  and which influences 
political decision making by infiltrating the political participatory structure.”114 Ana Belen Soage 
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discusses the influence of Yusef al-Qaradawi on the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood today. 
Al-Qaradawi advocated an ideology that was traditional but also compatible with the modern 
political environment. Wasatiyya, Soage believes, has been a major influence on the 
Brotherhood’s shift towards democratic participation in the political system.
 The transformation of ideology in the direction of democracy, pluralism, and nonviolence 
is important to note when studying the prospect of democratic change in Egypt today. There is 
general agreement that  the adoption of democratic ideals will positively contribute to the future 
of democracy in Egypt because it shows a desire to work within the confines of the constitution. 
The transformation of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1980’s is a topic of considerable interest to 
many scholars who study the growth of Islamist movements in Egypt. This transition has also led 
to increased interest in the results of elections in which the Muslim Brotherhood has participated. 
Some scholars, such as Tarek Masoud, believe that Western fears over the growing popularity  of 
the Muslim Brotherhood are unfounded. In 2005, he wrote, the Muslim Brotherhood “garnered 
only about a third of all ballots cast, amid voter turnout of less than 25 percent.”115 According to 
Masoud, the religious ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood ensures that it will only be supported 
by a minority of the population. If a higher percentage of Egyptians had turned out to vote, the 
results would have been different. Shadi Hamid states that Islamist groups, such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood, are the only opposition groups capable of winning free and fair elections against 
the ruling regime. He writes, however, that the Muslim Brotherhood does not try  to win elections 
because they value “self-preservation over political contestation.”116  In 2005, for example, the 
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Muslim Brotherhood only  contested 36.3% of the seats (161 out of 444) to prevent Mubarak’s 
regime from retaliating in order to maintain a majority in parliament.117  This same idea is 
expressed by Lisa Blaydes in Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak’s Egypt. Elections 
are “an opportunity for the organization to establish itself as the most viable opposition group in 
the country without posing a direct challenge to the short-term existence of the regime.”118 
The Constitutional Vision of the Muslim Brotherhood
 A majority of the scholars who have explored this subject have been inclined to view the 
Muslim Brotherhoods’ intentions in Egyptian politics as genuine and feasible. Based on 
documents released by the Brotherhood and the testimony  of its leadership, it is clear that the 
organization has transformed in the decades since its creation into a political entity intent on 
participating in the constitutional system. Muhammad Ma’mun al-Hudaybi, a Brotherhood 
spokesman and later the general guide, wrote that “in Egypt there is a certain degree of 
democracy; we guard and hold on to it. We work to confirm and develop it until rights are 
complete. It is important to confirm the democratic pursuit in practice.”119 In a statement released 
in 1991, the Muslim Brotherhood publicly declared its official support for democracy and its 
continued integration into the Egyptian political system. The 10 point consensus was agreed 
upon by the Brotherhood and nine other opposition parties. It stated:
01. Commitment to the human rights and public liberties 
 mentioned in shari’a and international law;  
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02. An end to the state of emergency and martial law;
03. A lifting of restrictions on the formation of political parties;
04. The independent supervision of elections by the judiciary;
05. The adoption of the parliamentary system in which the 
 executive power will be vested in the cabinet, which is 
 selected from the party with the majority;
06. Guarantee of the right of the People’s Assembly to amend the 
 budget; granting the Shura Council powers of oversight and 
 legislation;
07. Choice of the president through direct election from a list of 
 several candidates, with a limit of two terms;
08. The compatibility of all legislation passed with shari’a, with 
 emphasis on the rights of non-Muslims to follow their own 
 religious law in case of contradiction;
09. The independence of the judiciary;
10. Freedom of the press and media from government control 
 and equal opportunities for all parties in the official media.120
In “The Electoral Program of the Muslim Brotherhood for Shura Council in 2007,” released in 
June 2007, the idea that the “state’s regime should be republican, parliamentary, constitutional 
and democratic in accordance with the Islamic Sharia” is expanded.121
 Prior to the overthrow of Mubarak and the plans to adopt a new constitution, the Muslim 
Brotherhood accepted the current constitution with only  a few minor changes. The Draft 
Platform for the Political Party, also released in 2007, stated that Article Two of the constitution 
provides the link between the political and religious agendas of the Muslim Brotherhood.122 
Article Two states that “Islam is the religion of the state and Arabic its official language. 
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Principles of Islamic law (Shari’a) are the principle source of legislation.”123  In addition, the 
platform recognizes Egypt as a civil state and citizenship  based on nationality. The 2007 
Electoral Program stated:
Belief in equality among all Egyptian citizens as stipulated in the 
constitution and law and according to the principles of citizenship and 
equal opportunities regardless of faith, city  or gender. Everyone is free 
to practice basic political and social freedom as long as he/she enjoys 
Egyptian citizenship.124
The Muslim Brotherhood also respects the independence of the Supreme Constitutional Court 
(SCC), which is granted the power to interpret the meaning of shari’a through a process of 
Islamic judicial review.
Coptic Christians and Women: Equal Partners?
 The Electoral Program and Draft Platform reflect the ability of the Brotherhood to adapt 
the concept of shari’a to democratic institutions. However, a fear that predominates this 
discourse is that Egypt will morph into a theocracy governed by a small, elite group of religious 
scholars who possess a veto power over legislation. These fears have been exacerbated by the 
Islamic Revolution in Iran and the revolution and subsequent civil war in Algeria. Others fear the 
rights of women and Coptic Christian, who make up 10% of the population, will be diminished. 
 Accounts of the Brotherhood’s position on Copts and women contain contradictions that 
hinder a comprehensive evaluation of their intentions. For example, Mohamad Habib said that 
Coptic Christians should have equal rights except the right to become head of state. On the other 
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hand, Al-Futuh claims that there is no objection to a Copt becoming President.125 The Electoral 
Program officially maintains that Copts will share the same rights as their Muslim brethren, 
including the ability  to hold public office and the “freedom of faith and worship.”126 Despite the 
assurance, violence against Copts following the revolution has increased fears that an Islamist 
victory will lead to further hardships. Mina Samir, a 22-year-old university  student and a Coptic 
Christian, believes that  the Brotherhood will set Egypt back 500 years.127 Statements released by 
the Brotherhood, however, condemn such violence and hold that political cooperation between 
the two groups is possible. Amr Darrag, the head of the Giza branch of the Freedom and Justice 
Party, said that “there are so many Christians who are convinced with our references and our way 
of approaching problems and they  are willing to participate with us in our work towards, you 
know, having [a] better Egypt.”128 
 The matter of women’s rights is just as controversial as the fate of the Coptic Christians. 
Many fear that  an Islamist state will limit the rights of women to participate fully in the state in 
an equal capacity to men. The Muslim Brotherhood’s 2007 Electoral Program emphasized the 
importance of education, financial independence, and political participation for women. General 
guide Mahdi Akef stated that women could hold any position but the presidency  and pursue 
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studies “that responds to their nature, role and needs.”129 However, many question the sincerity 
of those claims. Dalia Ziada, a 29-year-old human rights activist and candidate for parliament, 
conveys these fears. When asked whether the success of the Muslim Brotherhood and the ultra-
conservative Salafi party in the first round of the 2011 parliamentary  elections worries her, she 
replied:
Of course, it worries me very  much. How will they behave regarding 
women. . . . the Muslim Brotherhood, at the end of the day, is a 
political group and they keep  changing according to what people want. 
They don’t stick to religion as much as the Salafi.130
Although she expresses worry over the potential of Islamist groups to impinge on women’s 
rights, Ziada claims that the Brotherhood will uphold their promise because it is what the people 
want. Within the movement itself, women have been among the most important political activists 
in terms of volunteer work and a large portion of their electoral success comes from the female 
vote. The Muslim Brotherhood has a political incentive to maintain its promises regarding the 
rights of women.131 A question that  remains unsolved is whether denying women and Copts the 
chance to become the head of state precludes compatibility with democracy. 
The Implementation of Shari’a
 Harnisch and Mecham discuss the two different  approaches to democracy, one supported 
by the old guard and the other by  the new. The new guard believes that the people, through the 
concept of shura, would elect the candidate who shares their interpretation of shari’a law, 
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therefore making the shari’a subject to the interpretation of legislators. The old guard wants to 
create a Council of Religious Scholars that would have the power to veto legislation deemed 
inconsistent with shari’a. The council would resemble the Council of Guardians in Iran, a 
distinctly  undemocratic political body. Pro-democracy  supporters within the organization and 
outside fear that this addition would render the executive and legislative branches useless.132 
Mehdi Akef, general guide from 2004 to 2010, responded to these fears in an interview, stating 
that “I do not accept doubts of our intentions from anyone. Our intentions are known and open. 
We demand full democracy and peaceful transition of power.”133  How exactly the Muslim 
Brotherhood will resolve the question of shari’a interpretation and implementation is unknown 
at this point because they have never been given the opportunity. The fall of Mubarak and 
subsequent plans to write a new Egyptian Constitution will provide the chance for the Muslim 
Brotherhood to put their rhetoric into action. 
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CHAPTER FIVE
POST-MUBARAK
 The knowledge of the Muslim Brotherhood’s historical beginnings and the shifts in its 
ideology are necessary to determine the success or failure of democracy in the newly liberalized 
post-Mubarak state of Egypt. The participation of the Muslim Brotherhood in the political sphere 
in the 1980s brought about a transition in ideology towards the acceptance and incorporation of 
democratic principles. Inclusion in politics has led to the emergence of a more moderate 
Brotherhood that is willing to blend religion and politics to participate successfully in the state. 
The question that arises now is what role the Brotherhood will have in the new state.
 A recent survey  conducted by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press in 
2011 asked Egyptians what opinion they had of the Muslim Brotherhood. A majority  of 75% 
claimed a very favorable or somewhat favorable opinion, while an additional 5% were 
uncertain.134 Another survey conducted by the Program on International Policy Attitudes resulted 
in 56% of urban Egyptians from Cairo, Alexandria, Giza, and Subra supporting the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s blend of Islamism and democracy in elections.135  The same organization also 
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asked urban Egyptians if they believed the Muslim Brotherhood considers democracy the best 
type of political system. The result was that 69% agreed, with 6% unsure.136
 Fear that the Muslim Brotherhood will retract its previous position on democracy now 
that they are legitimate is still on the minds of many in the West, as well as many secular 
intellectuals in Egypt itself. Gigi Ibrahim, a blogger and participant in the youth movement to 
bring down Mubarak, expressed his skepticism when he said, “They have been created to scare 
us from democracy. And now that we have democracy, it will be interesting [to see] who they 
really are."137  A senior spokesman for the Brotherhood, Essam el-Errian, responded in an 
interview to the claim that  the new Egyptian government would have to be purely  secular or 
purely  religious. He stated that “democracy is built on (unintelligible), which is universal, 
humanitarian. Human dignity, development, equality, freedom. All of these principles are the 
point of Islam. And so, Islam is compatible with democracy. Our democracy will be unique 
because it joined a morality, worship and also we can add to this democracy  our Islamic 
spirit.”138   To summarize, it will not follow the path of Iran’s theocracy or Turkey’s secular 
government. 
 Numerous claims from within the society itself that the Brotherhood will not try to take 
power and the testimony of experts on the subject look favorably on a peaceful transition to 
democracy. A recent interview for NPR with Steven Cooks, a senior fellow for Middle Eastern 
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studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, sheds light  on the current situation. When asked 
what a victory for the Muslim Brotherhood would mean for Egypt, Cook responded:
I don’t think there’s going to be an outright Muslim Brotherhood 
victory. But I think the Brotherhood is likely  to do extraordinarily well 
in these elections, perhaps 30 to 35 percent of the seats in the People’s 
Assembly. That is going to be more than any other single party and 
this People’s Assembly will pick a committee of 100 to write Egypt’s 
new constitution.139
A survey  conducted by the Pew Research Center in April 2011 asked Egyptians which group 
they  would most like to see lead the new democratic government. The Muslim Brotherhood 
achieved only 17% of the vote, behind the New Wafd Party (20%).140 The key  to Egypt’s success 
as a democracy is not dependent on the Muslim Brotherhood, but on the presence of opposition 
parties. In this case, Masoud was correct when he called for the strengthening of liberal secular 
parties. Increased competitiveness in elections is crucial for avoiding single party  rule. An active 
democracy  will force the Brotherhood, and other parties, to continue participating in the legal 
political system.
 Despite vagueness in the Brotherhood’s political agenda and uncertainties over the equal 
status of minorities and women, the Brotherhood has adhered to a gradual transition to power 
both before and after the revolution. The foundation of the movement’s political ideology, 
established in the 1980s, has ensured the strength and success of the progressive factions of the 
society over the conservatives. Ideologues, such as al-Banna, al-Hudaybi, al-Tilmisani, and al-
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Qaradawi, have contributed to this transformation, turning the society away from violence and 
isolation and towards participation in the political system. Only time will tell what direction the 
Brotherhood will take in forming the new Egyptian state, but based on the movements’ recent 
history in the political sphere, the outlook for democracy is hopeful.
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